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TERM OF THE COURT
This language, of course, was used to determine the meaning of
words within a contract already formed. The reasoning is sound,
however, and so this language has now been applied by the court
to situations where a question of ambiguity arises regarding the
meaning given words upon the formation of a possible contract.
C. JUDLEY WYANT
CRIMINAL LAW
I. EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the term just completed,
dealt with a number of aspects concerning "effective counsel" in
criminal matters. The Court prescribed the length of time a defense
counsel's responsibility extends to his client;1 ruled on the number
of defendants one lawyer may represent in one case;2 and, in one
of the more important decisions of the term, changed the standards
by which "effective counsel" is determined.
3
The question of what is effective counsel has become increas-
ingly prevalent. This area is a most difficult one because such a
question can only be answered on a case by case basis: by encom-
passing the rights of the defendant, the facts of the case and the
professional judgment and strategy of the defense counsel. The
rights of the defendant are defined by both the Federal and State
Constitutions, and by extensive case law. The facts of the case are
presented in the trial court's record and in effect form the basis of
review for the supreme court. It is the last two factors, professional
judgment and strategy of the defense counsel, that present the most
problems. These factors are nebulous at best and any attempt to
mold them into a set formula is an extremely difficult task.
In an attempt to deal with factors of professional judgment and
strategy the court held in State v. Simmons4 that an evidentiary
hearing must be held whenever the competency of counsel is at-
tacked. In the Simmons case the defendant was charged and found
guilty of having sexual intercourse with a child. The defendant was
represented by a court-appointed counsel until after conviction at
1. Whitmore v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 706, 203 N.W.2d 56 (1973).
2. State ex rel White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1972).
3. State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
4. 57 Wis. 2d 285, 203 N.W.2d 887 (1973).
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which time there was a substitution of counsel. On appeal from the
conviction, sentence, and order denying a new trial, the defendant
claimed that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The main
basis for alleging ineffective counsel concerned the admission of
certain evidence. It seems that the complete chain of escort was not
presented when the evidence was admitted and the defense counsel
did not object. The court stated,
We cannot assume that trial counsel's failure to object to this
evidence was the result of incompetence or is evidence of ineffec-
tive counsel. It well might have been a strategic waiver under the
circumstances of the order of proof.5
The court then applied a test used in prior cases' stating that:
• . . trial counsel is ineffective only when it is shown that the
representation was so inadequate and of such low competence
that it amounted to no representation at all and reduced the trial
to a show and mockery of justice.7
The court further stated that when a trial counsel's competency
is being challenged he should be given notice of the challenge.8 In
order to clarify its position that effectiveness of counsel can pro-
perly be challenged the court adopted Standard 8.6 of the ABA
Project of Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to
the Defense Function. It provides:
(a) If a lawyer, after investigation, is satisfied that another
lawyer who served in an earlier phase of the case did not provide
effective assistance, he should not hesitate to seek relief for the
defendant on that ground.
(b) If a lawyer, after investigation, is satisfied that another
lawyer who served in an earlier phase of the case provided effec-
tive assistance, he should so advise his client and he may decline
to proceed further.
(c) A lawyer whose conduct of a criminal case is drawn into
question is entitled to testify concerning the accusations, even
though this involves revealing matters which were given in
confidence.
5. 57 Wis. 2d at 297.
6. See also Swonger v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 468, 474, 195 N.W.2d 598 (1972); Quinn v.
State, 53 Wis. 2d 821, 825, 193 N.W.2d 665 (1972); Milburn v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 53, 65,
183 N.W.2d 70 (1971).
7. 57 Wis. 2d at 294.
8. Id. at 297. "When the competency of trial counsel is questioned, it is incumbent upon
one who seeks to show that incompetency to give notice to trial counsel that his handling
of a criminal matter is being questioned on post-trial or post-conviction proceedings."
[Vol. 57
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These standards assist procedurally when questioning the effective-
ness of counsel but do little in answering the question of what is,
in fact, effective counsel. As an answer to this question, the court
in Simmons, as in prior cases, used the test of whether the trial was
a mockery of justice as a result of the counsel's representation.
A few months after the Simmons case, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court changed its test for effective counsel as noted in State v.
Harper.9 In making this change, the court discontinued a test that
has been used since 196410 in favor of a test that, in the opinion of
the court, was a higher test for competency. It is submitted that
this change in Wisconsin law is probably the most significant
change in the criminal law during the Court term under
consideration.
Harper was charged with and found guilty of armed robbery.
He was represented by a court-appointed lawyer through the trial
and sentencing. In appealing the conviction, the defendant alleged
ineffective trial counsel as one of the grounds for overturning the
conviction. In accordance with the holding in Simmons, the trial
lawyer was given notice of the challenge to his competency and was
given an opportunity to testify as to the reason for his conduct of
the trial. At the end of this hearing, the court found that the
representation has been competent and that counsel was effective.
The court stated that under the old "mockery of justice" test,
Harper had been afforded effective counsel. This time, however,
the court changed the test for competent counsel to "the represen-
tation must be equal to that which the ordinary prudent lawyer,
skilled and versed in criminal law, would give to clients who had
privately retained his services."" The court used this test in light
of the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution and The De-
fense Function (Approved Draft 1971) sections 3.2, 3.6, 3.9, 4.1
and 5.2.12 The ruling that Harper had been afforded effective coun-
9. 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
10. See Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 148, 126 N.W.2d 625 (1964).
II. 57 Wis. 2d at 557.
12. "3.2 Interviewing the client.
"(a) As soon as practicable the lawyer should seek to determine all relevant
facts known to the accused. In so doing, the lawyer should probe for all legally
relevant information without seeking to influence the direction of the client's respon-
ses."
"3.6 Prompt action to protect the accused.
"(a) Many important rights of the accused can be protected and preserved only
by prompt legal action. The lawyer should inform the accused of his rights forthwith
and take all necessary action to vindicate such rights. He should consider all proce-
19741
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sel under the old standard indicates that the court was applying the
new standard prospectively only.
It is submitted that the "standard" the court adopted is not
really a standard at all but is a restatement of a defense attorney's
duty to his client. It is the duty that should be fulfilled regardless
of whether the lawyer is privately retained or appointed by the
court. The adoption of this standard does not make the issue of
effective counsel any clearer than before. In fact, it is possible that
the answer to whether a defendant was represented by effective
counsel is now even more difficult to ascertain. The court shifted
from an objective to a subjective test. The old standard permitted
the court to look at the results of the representation in regard to
the defendant's rights and conclude within the facts whether there
was a "mockery of justice" or an effective defense. The new stan-
dard introduces extraneous factors into the determination by com-
paring the judgment of the trial counsel with that of another un-
dural steps which in good faith may be taken, including, for example, motions
seeking pretrial release of the accused, obtaining psychiatric examination of the
accused when a need appears, moving for a change of venue or continuance, moving
to suppress illegally obtained evidence, moving for severance from jointly charged
defendants, or seeking dismissal of the charges.
"(b) A lawyer should not act as surety on a bail bond either for the accused or
others."
"4.1 Duty to investigate.
"It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstan-
ces of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree
of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to secure informa-
tion in the possession or the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty
to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the
lawyer of facts constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty."
"5.2 Control and direction of the case.
"(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the
accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be
made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter;
(ii) whether to waive jury trial; (iii) whether to testify in his own behalf.
"(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct
cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be
made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the
lawyer after consultation with his client.
"(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises between
the lawyer and his client, the lawyer should make a record of the circumstances, his
advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached. The record should be made in a
manner which protects the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relation."
"8.6 Challenges to the effectivness of counsel. ..
"(c) A lawyer whose conduct of a criminal case is drawn into question is entitled
to testify concerning the matters charged and is not precluded from disclosing the
truth concerning the accusation, even though this involves revealing matters which
were given in confidence."
[Vol. 57
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known, privately retained counsel who had nothing to do with the
case.
When looking at the effectiveness of counsel, the focus of in-
quiry should be on whether the rights of the defendant were pro-
tected. The ABA recognized this when it promulgated the above
mentioned sections that the Wisconsin court approved. It is doubt-
ful that the court meant anything other than what the ABA stan-
dards suggest when it used the language in setting out the new test.
But the language unfortunately raises questions that should not
have to be considered when considering the rights of the defendant.
For instance, does the fact that an attorney is handling his first
criminal defense automatically subject him to an ineffectual coun-
sel charge because he is without experience in this area? Does an
attorney who usually is privately retained becomes less skilled or
effective because he is appointed to defend an indigent? Which
lawyer or lawyers will be used as a control to measure the alleged
ineffective lawyer? Will such attorneys be selected from the county,
state, or nation? Will attorneys be subpoenaed to appear at a
hearing to answer a hypothetical question and render an opinion
of how they would have conducted the trial, much like a doctor in
a medical malpractice case? It is submitted that such questions will
not have to be answered if the particular attorney's conduct and
judgment during a criminal defense are weighed against the consti-
tutional standards of adequate protection of a defendant's rights
when effectiveness of counsel is in issue.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The 1972 term also produced a number of cases dealing with
search by police officers without warrant.
The court reviewed two exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
requirement of a search warrant in the case State v. Pires. In that
case the police were dispatched to the defendant's residence to
investigate the reported death of a child. Prior to the arrival of
detectives a police ambulance conveyed the child, defendant-
mother, and the father to the hospital. When detectives arrived
they entered the house to look for the victims, unaware that the
the victim had already been removed from the premises. Several
minutes later more police arrived and informed the detectives on
the scene of the prior conveyance of the victim to the hospital and
that the mishap apparently was the result of a drug overdose. The
13. 55 Wis. 2d 587, 201 N.W.2d 153 (1973).
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police then made a second search of the house and recovered incul-
patory evidence which was found on a nightstand in a room other
than the room where the police originally were positioned. The
defendant moved to suppress this evidence and the motion was
sustained by the trial court. The State appealed and the supreme
court affirmed the trial court.
In finding the search and seizure of the inculpatory evidence
unconstitutional, the court continued the trend to hold warrantless
searches illegal. The search in Pires was thought to be justified by
the "emergency" or "exigent circumstances" exception. This ex-
ception is based on the reasonableness of police conduct in assist-
ing the victim or apprehending those responsible for a crime." The
court found that the first entry into the house for the purpose of
searching for victims was reasonable, but the second search, in
which the inculpatory evidence was seized, was illegal because at
that time the police had knowledge of the victim's whereabouts and
that the house was vacant of any possible suspects. By voiding the
legality of the search as it did, the court was affirming the holdings
of federal courts and its own decision of protecting the public by
requiring a warrant to search. 5
The other non-statutory exception to the requirement of a
search warrant that the court dealt with in Pires was the "plain
view" doctrine. That doctrine allows authorities to seize evidence
without a search warrant when such evidence is in plain view. 6 The
crux of the exception is that the police must be in a position law-
fully to view the evidence. In Pires the police did not see the evi-
dence during the first lawful search, it was not until during the
second search that the evidence was seized. However, as discussed
above, the police were not justified in making the second search,
and hence were not in a position to lawfully observe the evidence.
Therefore, the "plain view" exception did not apply. Here again
the court was following a well established line of cases prohibiting
warrantless searches.' 7
This past term also produced a number of cases concerning a
statutory'8 exception to the need for a search warrant. This excep-
14. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1973).
15. Eg. Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis.
2d 177, 170 N.W.2d 755 (1969); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964).
16. Id.
17. See also, Ball v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 653, 205 N.W.2d 353 (1973).
18. WIs. STAT. §§968.24 and 968.25 (1971).
[Vol. 57
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tion for a search during temporary questioning is the codification
of the Terry v. Ohio rule, 9 the "stop and frisk" rule. The three
cases considered were, Waite v. State,2 State v. Beaty,21 and State
v. Williamson .22
In Waite, the defendant was stopped by police for questioning.
One of the officers testified that he observed a "bulge" in the outer
coat pocket of the defendant and for his own protection reached
into the pocket with his hand. The officer removed a plastic bag
containing pills that were subsequently introduced as evidence at
trial. The supreme court held that this action of the officer was
reasonable and therefore the search was not illegal. 23 It is submit-
ted, however, that such conduct was not reasonable because there
was no pat down to determine if in fact there was an instrument
that could have harmed the officers. The cases cited by the court
24
to substantiate its holding of reasonableness of the search involved
situations where in fact there was a pat down prior to the intrusion
of the person's right to privacy. Adams v. Williams 25 is a case
similar to Waite in that there was no pat down prior to intrusion.
Adams, though, can be distinguished on the facts. In Adams the
police officer had information from a reliable informer that the
defendant was armed and he was told the exact location of the gun
on the defendant's person. There was no such prior knowledge by
the officer in Waite. At that point in time there was no probable
cause to arrest the defendant nor reasonable grounds to search him
in the manner used. Therefore the evidence obtained should not
have been admitted.
The Beaty case involved the stopping of the defendant after his
suspicious conduct was observed by the police. The police patted
down the defendant and produced evidence that was subsequently
used at trial. The court again used the cases cited in the Waite case
to uphold the search.26 In this case the court, placing its emphasis
on the fact of the unexplained bulky objects in the coat pockets and
a subsequent pat down, held the officers were entitled to reach into
19. 392 U.S. I (1968).
20. 57 Wis. 2d 218, 203 N.W.2d 719 (1973).
21. 57 Wis. 2d 531, 205 N.W.2d 11 (1973).
22. 58 Wis. 2d 514, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973).
23. 57 Wis. 2d 218, 222, 203 N.W.2d 719 (1973).
24. Terry v. Ohio, supra n. 19, State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 198 N.W.2d 377
(1972).
25. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
26. See supra n.24.
1974]
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the pockets and empty the contents. The apparent incongruity in
the court's application of the "stop and frisk" rule as between
Waite and Beaty raises question as to what the court considers a
reasonable search.
In the Williamson case the defendant was convicted of carrying
a concealed weapon based on evidence obtained in a stop and frisk
type search. The police officer observed the defendant acting suspi-
ciously. After stopping the defendant, the officer proceeded to
question the defendant while the defendant was in an automobile.
When the defendant was unable to produce a driver's license or
other identification, the officer requested that the defendant step
out of the car. After the defednant egressed, the officer patted the
defendant down and felt hard objects in the pants of the defendant.
The defendant was asked to remove the objects and the defendant
produced six .38-caliber catridges. The supreme court held this
limited search was legal based on the premise that under the cir-
cumstances the stopping was reasonable and the "very limited
frisking or pat-down" was allowable so that the officer could con-
tinue his investigation without fear of violence. 28 A further search
of the automobile, also held reasonable and legal, produced a
loaded .38-caliber revolver.
The circumstances in the Beaty and Williamson cases, which
gave rise to the original police conduct, seemed to have been far
more suspicious than the circumstance in the Waite case. Notwith-
standing that fact, the court still held the Waite search reasonable
without the pat down. Generally, however, the court does follow
the trend established by previous cases29 that a stop and frisk
search will be upheld if there is: 1) suspicious conduct by the defen-
dant, 2) reasonable stopping to question, 3) reasonable fear for
personal safety by the police, or 4) a pat down or knowledge by
the police that the defendant is armed. However, the Waite case is
outside this trend and therefore raised questions as to the court's
application of the "stop and frisk" rationale.
III. CRIMINAL PLEAS
A. Guilty Pleas
Pleading guilty to a criminal charge is, of course, a serious
27. 57 Wis. 2d 531, 539, 205 N.W.2d II (1973).
28. 58 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973).
29. Terry v. Ohio, supra n. 19; Adams v. Williams, supra n. 25, State v. Chambers,
supra n. 24.
[Vol. 57
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matter since a person doing so relinquishes constitutionally guar-
anteed rights. In an effort to assure that a guilty plea is properly
taken, the United States Supreme Court has imposed certain re-
quirements: 1) It must be made voluntarily and knowingly repre-
senting an intelligent choice among alternative courses of action
open to the defendant;" and 2) it must be voluntary and non-
coerced to withstand an attack as rewarding denial of due pro-
cess. 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Ernst v. State,3 held
that these requirements for accepting a guilty plea are applicable
to the states. The Wisconsin Legislature had codified similar
requirements.3
In the case of State v. Chabonian34 the court considered the
issue of whether a guilty plea was "voluntarily and knowledgea-
bly" made when the defendant was represented by counsel. The
defendant in the case moved for post conviction relief pursuant to
Wisconsin Statutes Section 974.06 alleging that there was an argu-
able defense to the crime charged and therefore the guilty plea
should not have been accepted. The trial court denied the motion,
and the supreme court affirmed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on the fact that the defen-
dant was represented by counsel at the arraignment and therefore
there was a presumption that the plea had been knowledgeably and
voluntarily made. This presumption was recognized in State v.
Strickland,35 a case decided before the United States Supreme
Court had formulated its present requirements in Boykin v.
Alabama,3 and was applied to defendants convicted before
Boykin. The onus of overcoming this presumption was on the de-
fendant. However, in applying this presumption to the defendant
in Chabonian, the supreme court also relied on a post-Boykin case,
North Carolina v. Alford,37 in which the defendant was also repre-
30. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
31. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
32. 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969).
33. WIs. STATS. §971.08(1):
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall:
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is made volun-
tarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment
if convicted; and
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the
crime charged.
34. 55 Wis. 2d 723, 201 N.W.2d 25 (1972).
35. 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965).
36. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
37. See supra n. 30.
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sented by counsel. In both the Alford and Chabonian cases there
was also a strong factual basis of guilt. It might be inferred from
the Chabonian holding that when there is a factual basis of guilt;
adequate representation by counsel; and a minimal inquiry by the
court of the defendant's knowledge of the charge, the requirement
of Boykin and Wisconsin Statutes Section 971.08(1) will have been
met.
B. Plea Bargaining
A procedure that is frequently associated with guilty pleas is
that of "plea bargaining." The effects of a plea bargain can occur
at several stages in the criminal justice system. For a promise to
plead guilty, the district attorney may decline to charge other pos-
sible crimes; may dismiss or reduce charges; or in return for the
promise, may recommend a lenient sentence. 8 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional validity of such
plea bargaining. 9
An important aspect of plea bargaining was considered by the
supreme court in State ex rel. White v. Gray0 and Wilson v.
State." In these cases the court considered the making of a record
of the substance of the bargain.
In White, the defendant, after pleading guilty, was convicted of
burglary and sentenced to a state prison. The defendant, in his
post-conviction proceedings, alleged that his guilty plea was not
voluntary and that he would be allowed to withdraw his plea. The
defendant entered a guilty plea and charges against his brother
were subsequently dropped.
The matter of making a record of the bargain reached has been
recommended in a number of previous Wisconsin cases42 and is in
fact required in two other jurisdictions. 3 The Wisconsin court
gave two reasons why a record should be made: 1) ". . . to protect
the defendant in the event the prosecutor reneges from his part of
the bargain" and 2) ". . . to protect the state against later false
38. See BROWN, THE WISCONSIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND THE CRIMINAL CASE 110
(1971).
39. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 472 (1970).
40. 57 Wis. 2d 17, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1972).
41. 57 Wis. 2d 508, 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973).
42. State v. Harrell, 40 Wis. 2d 187, 161 N.W.2d 223 (1968); State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis.
2d 478, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970); Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).
43. People v. West, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (1970); Commonwealth v. Alvar-
ado, 442 Pa. 2d 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971).
[Vol. 57
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claims of unkept bargains. . .,"I In White the court continued its
insistence that a record of a plea bargain be made and remanded
the case to the trial court for a fact finding hearing concerning the
plea bargain because of the incomplete record.
It should be noted that in the White case the court also consid-
ered a matter of first impression in this jurisdiction, namely, what
effect a special concession to another person had on the plea bar-
gaining with the defendant. However, the court did not answer this
question because of the incomplete record, but did conclude that
.. . the voluntariness of a plea bargain which contemplates spe-
cial concessions to another . . . especially a sibling or a loved
one . . . bears particular scrutiny by a trial or reviewing court
conscious of the psychological pressures upon an accused such a
situation creates. 45
The Wilson case was similar to the White case in that the
defendant, after pleading guilty, was found guilty of the charge of
burglary. It was not until after the defendant's probation was re-
voked that he attempted to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds
that his plea was not voluntary. In Wilson the court continued its
trend of requiring that a record be made of the plea bargain and
approved its holding on that aspect in the White case.
When considering the voluntariness of the guilty plea, the court
noted that the defendant was represented by counsel and made
several references to the conduct of the defense counsel on behalf
of the defendant during the proceedings. The court held that the
plea was voluntarily given and that there was no "manifest necess-
ity" to withdraw the guilty plea. It is submitted that when consider-
ing whether or not the guilty plea was voluntary, the court indulged
in the presumption explained above in the Chabonian discussion.
The court stated in the course of its opinion:
Cases involving a plea bargain where the defendant is represented
by counsel stand on a somewhat different basis than those where
the defendant pleads guilty without an agreement or waives coun-
sel and pleads guilty."
Therefore, it seems that the court is following a trend, started with
Strickland, towards being more lenient with the trial court in tak-
ing a guilty plea when the defendant is represented by counsel, than
44. 47 Wis. 2d at 24.
45. 57 Wis. 2d at 29.
46. 57 Wis. 2d at 511.
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when he is not.
Plea bargaining has a necessary function in the criminal justice
system in that it terminates many criminal prosecutions with a
guilty plea. This helps the courts to process more cases, which in
turn tends to lessen the large backlog of cases experienced today.
This function is becoming more important every day and an expan-
sion of the scope of plea bargaining, but maintaining the rights of
the defendant, does not seem unrealistic. The inclusion of a judge
in the bargaining process, in an appropriate case, also does not
seem improper. Such action would eliminate an extra step in the
system and would benefit both the state and the defendant in that
the matter could be disposed of immediately rather than proceed-
ing to the court and informing the judge of what had transpired at
the bargaining session.
JAMES A. WILKE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
The most significant case of the Term in the area of domestic
relations considered the termination of parental rights of a natural
father to his illegitimate child, State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran
Social Services) In that case Jerry D. Rothstein sought to gain
custody of a child born out of wedlock. Rothstein swore he was
the natural father of the child, and had made his desire to take
custody of the child known to the mother prior to the child's birth.
However, the mother kept the birth and whereabouts of the child
secret, until after her parental rights had been terminated at a
hearing of the LaCrosse County Court. The child had subsequently
been placed in a prospective adoptive home.
Because Rothstein had been given no notice of this hearing to
terminate parental rights, he sought to vacate the county court
order and petitioned that court for a hearing concerning his right
to care, custody and control of the child. The county court denied
his petition, and Rothstein appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus to determine his rights to legal
custody of the child.
In an earlier case,2 the court had determined that Rothstein, as
I. 59 Wis. 2d I, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
2. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56
(1970).
[Vol. 57
